Blog 6

Blog 6

            This week's events--two conservatorship hearings and a deposition--reinforced the routine, everyday work of an attorney. In addition, I honed my interpretive and argumentative skills, while I continued researching for my SRP and for cases at my internship.

Monday

            Because today's hearing was rescheduled, I had time to research the latest examples of student  newspaper censorship on the Foundation for Individual Rights and Education and the Student Press Law Center websites.

Tuesday

            More research allowed me to narrow down the relevant Supreme Court case law on the First Amendment in public high schools--Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986), Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988), Morse et. al. v. Frederick (2007). Likewise, I studied precedent from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Arizona, as well as 15 Federal Judicial districts (mostly Western States, Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam). The pertinent Ninth Circuit case is Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School District (1989), However, both Fraser and Morse are Ninth Circuit decisions that were overruled. The circuit court confusion in interpreting Hazelwood often produces speech-restrictive results. For example, the Tenth Circuit Court case of Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R1(2002), upheld viewpoint discrimination--a type of discrimination usually not even allowed in non-public forums. This case led me back to review once more the seminal public forum analysis Cornelius v. NAACP Leg. Def. Fund (1985). This research has cemented my opinion that Hazelwood's ambiguous standard for evaluating school censorship of student publications opened a Pandora's Box of infringement upon students' free speech, confirming Tinker's framework as the proper balancing of authority and expression.

Wednesday                                          

            At the Phoenix court house, we met with a minor's mother to prepare her for testimony before the judge in a minor's settlement. In this conservatorship hearing, the minor was only one month shy of 18. Everything went well. I realized that I am growing familiar with these routine processes. I've memorized the procedure and statements by now. More interesting, on a personal level, was meeting with the minor's attorney afterwards. He was in his twenties and had attended Dartmouth as an undergrad and then attended UA law school. He even interviews seniors who apply to Dartmouth. Although he loved his college experience, he returned to Arizona, where he was born and raised, because he wanted to avoid student debt. It was an enlightening perspective to consider as I hear results from out-of-state colleges.

            Later, I reissued my online survey to my targeted group of 83 faculty advisers for student publications in Arizona. Since I had only received 21 responses at this point, I attached a new cover letter explaining my need for a more accurate representation of respondents' experience with prior review and censorship. Gratifyingly, I immediately received two more; more dismayingly, I've only received a total of four more as of this writing. Nevertheless, the trend of the responses is strong and supports the anecdotal evidence that both faculty advisers and student editors practice self-censorship, arguably in light of the looming threat of prior review and restraint. Finally, I completed a detailed analysis of my survey results, using percentages to correlate relationships and establish trends.

Thursday

            Instead of attending legal proceedings or researching cases, today I practiced how to form a legal argument. My father, another attorney, and I engaged in a mock oral argument based on a dog-at-large statute case. Since this was my second time encountering this statute, I already understood about strict liability, but the facts in this case argued that three defendants were strictly liable. Thus, the issue was apportioning strict liability under the statute, rather than assessing the reasonableness of a party's actions under the common law. After reading an assessment of liability and damages, I disagreed with the conclusions and had to present my argument and recommendations. Interestingly, the second attorney had a completely contrary assessment of liability and damages. This lively debate highlighted how legal minds can differ and how interpretation is pivotal to apportionment of fault. No question of facts were being considered; we were preparing for a summary judgment based on the law.

Friday

            I was glad to conclude the week with a deposition. I look forward to depositions because the attorney must adapt his strategy to address the particular plaintiff being questioned. In this case, the plaintiff, a pharmacist, had both medical bills and wage loss claims based on a lower back injury from an automobile accident. Her car was rear-ended by the defendant's truck and propelled into a car in front of her, causing a chain reaction with three other cars. Because the defendant admitted liability, the issue concerned damages. The plaintiff's damages and wage loss claims were close to exhausting the defendant's insurance policy limit. Her persistent back pain is likely to continue in the future. The defendant's policy coverage was not large enough to fully compensate her injuries.

            Hearing her first statement--a lengthy, detailed list of her specific duties and tasks as a pharmaceutical manager--I knew instantly that my father would need to take a different strategy to accommodate this plaintiff. She further elaborated about her inability to perform everyday tasks at her job and at home. Moreover, inconclusive MRI reports failed to pinpoint a clear solution to her injury. Being sensitive and respectful to the plaintiff  during both the deposition and subsequent informal settlement conference, my father convinced the plaintiff to decide against pursuing the defendant's excess coverage. She accepted the defendant's offer of settlement and decided to pursue a claim on her own Underinsured Motorist Coverage (UIM).

            Before this case, I was not too familiar with either Underinsured Motorist Coverage or Uninsured Motorist Coverage, but now I realize the value of both. If you are hit by a driver who either lacks any automobile insurance or only possesses a policy limit lower than the dollar value of your damages from your injury, then you can make a claim with your own insurance company for the excess amount if you have Underinsured or Uninsured Motorist Coverage.

            Later that day, I returned to the dog-at-large case to continue polish my oral argument.